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Corporation	tax	as	a	problem	of	MNC	organizational	circuits:	The	case	for	
unitary	taxation	
	
Jamie	Morgan	
	
Abstract:	The	tax	practices	of	multinational	corporations	have	become	a	matter	of	
significant	public	and	political	concern.	The	underlying	issues	are	rooted	in	the	
capacity	 of	 MNCs	 to	 construct	 organizational	 circuits	 that	 enable	 taxes	 to	 be	
minimised	 in	 (ambiguously)	 legal	 ways.	 This	 is	 tax	 avoidance.	 Organizational	
circuits	are	one	example	of	what	Seabrooke	and	Wigan	refer	to	as	global	wealth	
chains.	The	capacity	to	avoid	tax	arises	because	of	the	way	MNCs	are	treated	as	a	
series	of	separate	entities,	subject	to	the	arm’s	length	principle.	Unitary	taxation	
based	on	formula	apportionment	provides	a	potential	solution	to	the	problems.	
This	paper	provides	an	overview	of	how	tax	avoidance	is	achieved,	the	problems	
that	 arise	 from	 this,	 and	 the	benefits	 of	 unitary	 taxation	 as	 an	 alternative,	 and	
places	this	in	the	context	of	current	policy	trends.	The	purpose	of	the	paper	is	to	
improve	 awareness	 amongst	 a	 politically	 literate	 academic	 readership	 of	 key	
issues	for	the	main	alternative	to	the	current	problematic	situation.	
	
Tackling	corporate	tax	avoidance:	The	case	for	unitary	taxation		
	
The	 European	 Commission	 estimates	 tax	 avoidance	 and	 evasion	 within	 the	
European	Union	 to	be	around	€1	 trillion	per	annum	(EC,	2012,	p.	2).	The	UK’s	
budget	deficit	 for	the	financial	year	2013‐2014	was	approximately	£108	billion	
and	public	 sector	net	debt	was	£1.4	 trillion.	 It	 is	within	 this	 context	of	 chronic	
public	debt	(see	Thompson,	2013;	Hay,	2013)	that	corporations	are	able	to	pay	
effective	 tax	 rates	 that	 are	 many	 times	 smaller	 than	 the	 headline	 rate	 of	
corporation	 tax.	 Any	 business	 able	 to	 locate	 separate	 entities	 in	 different	 tax	
jurisdictions	is	able	to	legally	limit	the	tax	that	it	pays	in	ways	that	are	not	open	to	
other	 firms	 or	 the	 ordinary	 citizen.	 This	 legal	 minimisation	 is	 tax	 avoidance	
(evasion	is	categorised	as	illegal	tax	behaviour,	the	difference	is	elaborated	later).	
As	 any	 reader	 of	 the	media	will	 know,	 tax	 avoidance	 has	 become	 a	 particular	
problem	 focused	 on	 multinational	 corporations	 (MNCs).	 The	 following	 paper	
explores,	with	a	focus	on	MNCs,	how	tax	minimisation	is	achieved.	This	is	based	
on	 the	 capacity	 to	 create	 organizational	 circuits	 through	 which	 MNCs	 can	
advantageously	shift	sales,	revenue	and	profit.	These	organizational	circuits	serve	
to	illustrate	the	significance	of	global	wealth	chains	(GWC,	Seabrooke	and	Wigan,	
2014)	as	an	important	adjunct	to	the	concept	of	global	value	chains.	Much	of	the	
capacity	to	engage	in	tax	avoidance	is	a	consequence	of	a	longstanding	structural	
flaw	in	the	international	tax	system.	Specifically,	reporting	on	the	basis	of	separate	
entity	status	and	the	arm’s	length	principle.	The	problems	that	arise	provide	the	
basis	of	the	case	for	unitary	taxation	of	the	MNC	as	a	single	organization.	
Corporation	tax	is	an	important	subject	matter	that	too	often	is	relegated	
to	 discussion	 among	 only	 the	 legally	 trained	 and	 technically	 proficient.	 The	
purpose	 of	 this	 paper	 is	 to	 improve	 awareness	 amongst	 a	 politically	 literate	
readership	of	 key	 issues	 for	 the	main	policy	 alternative.	 The	problem	of	 tax	 is	
necessarily	political.	In	order	for	unitary	taxation	to	become	policy	there	must	be	
momentum	for	its	adoption.	Unitary	taxation	involves	fundamental	change	to	the	
opportunities	available	to	corporations.	It	raises	both	technical	issues	of	design	
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and	strategic	issues	of	implementation.	However,	the	most	significant	hurdles	to	
its	adoption	are	ignorance	regarding	its	potential	and	resistance	based	on	power	
and	 embedded	 interests.	 In	 a	 democracy	 and	within	 international	 society,	 the	
former	augments	the	latter.		
The	paper	 is	 set	 out	 in	 several	 sections.	A	 first	 section	 sets	 out	 the	 key	
concepts	of	separate	entity	status	and	the	arm’s	length	principle,	which	shape	the	
current	potential	for	tax	avoidance	based	on	transfer	pricing.	The	second	section	
provides	a	generic	illustration	of	how	tax	avoidance	is	achieved.	The	third	section	
sets	out	the	current	problems	of	tax	avoidance,	and	this	leads	to	a	fourth	section,	
which	sets	out	unitary	taxation.	 	Unitary	taxation	creates	an	 initial	challenge	 in	
terms	of	achieving	agreement	to	establish	rules	of	application.	However,	the	issues	
arising	are	not	significantly	different	than	confront	any	constructive	attempt	to	
critically	contest	the	status	quo.	Neoliberalism	began	as	an	institutional	project‐
building	exercise	based	on	knowledge	sharing	and	policy	transfer,	and	any	policy	
change	 that	 contests	 its	 current	 form	 must	 also	 begin	 in	 the	 same	 way	 (e.g.	
Brenner	et	al,	2010).	A	 final	section	explores	some	of	 the	current	policy	trends	
likely	to	influence	the	adoption	of	unitary	taxation.				
	
The	emergence	of	a	structural	flaw:	
Separate	entity	status	and	the	arm’s	length	principle	
	
As	specialists	at	the	Tax	Justice	Network	have	consistently	argued,	the	problems	
of	 taxation	 associated	with	MNCs	 have	 a	 root	 cause	 in	 a	 ‘deep	 structural	 flaw’	
(Picciotto,	 2014,	 2012;	 CRC,	 2014).	 The	 fundamentals	 of	 the	 rules	 governing	
taxation	for	MNCs	date	back	to	the	1920s.	The	rules	are	ad	hoc,	based	on	many	
bilateral	 agreements	 rather	 than	 a	 single	 coherent,	 binding	 and	 governing	
multilateral	agreement.	However,	they	are	also	in	many	respects	common	based	
on	a	series	of	developments	of	model	treaties,	notably	from	the	OECD	(the	1992	
model	convention	is	now	in	its	9th	iteration,	OECD,	2014).	Agreements	share	key	
features.	Since	an	MNC	is	able	to	incorporate	legally	distinct	entities	and	locate	
these	in	any	accommodating	jurisdiction,	tax	agreements,	arising	law	and	practice	
have	developed	which	take	this	separate	entity	status	as	given.	The	primary	focus	
has	been	on	taxing	each	entity	based	on	its	reporting	of	income	in	that	jurisdiction.	
Issues	of	the	links	between	the	entities	follow	because	of	this	separation.		
Transformations	 throughout	 the	 later	 twentieth	 century	 have	 served	 to	
augment	the	problems.	Communication	technology	has	radically	transformed	the	
potential	for	the	geographical	separation	of	administration	from	other	aspects	of	
business	activity.	Also,	as	globalization	has	advanced	there	have	been	changes	to	
the	structure	of	production	and	administration.	These	include	long	supply	chains	
and	 complex	 systems	 of	 importation	 for	 final	 assembly.	 Changes	 create	 great	
scope	for	differentiations	along	chains	of	activity	and	this	has	normalised	(in	the	
sense	 they	 are	 common	 and	 thus	 expected)	 the	 existence	 of	 complex	
interconnections	 of	 entities	 (Clausing,	 2006).	 Concomitantly,	 there	 has	 been	 a	
qualitative	 shift	 in	 regard	 of	 the	 goods	 and	 services	 produced	 –	 tied	 more	 to	
branding,	intellectual	property	rights	and	patents	‐	and	how	they	are	sold	(via	the	
Web).	There	can	be	many	types	of	separation	and	this	can	conceal	 (within	and	
because	 of	 the	 normalisation	 of	 complex	 interconnections)	 that	 some	 forms	of	
separation	can	serve	non‐economic	ends,	in	the	sense	of	having	little	to	do	with	
actual	production	and	distribution	of	goods	and	services.i	Not	only	is	it	relatively	
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easy	to	create	separate	entities,	law	and	regulation	has	done	little	to	impede	the	
capacity	 to	do	 so,	 and	 in	many	places	has	 actively	 encouraged	 the	practice.	As	
Palan	 (2002)	 sets	 out,	 many	 states	 have	 “commercialised”	 their	 sovereignty	
within	a	global	political	economy.			
A	 further	 aspect	 of	 tax	 agreements	 arises	 because	 of	 the	 issue	 of	 links	
between	 entities.	 An	 MNC	 is	 a	 recognizable	 organization.	 The	 term	 is	 not	
senseless.	However,	 given	 that	 it	 can	be	 structured	 as	 a	 set	 of	 legally	 separate	
entities,	one	can	equally	say	that	it	does	not	exist	in	law	(Picciotto,	1992).	Yet	there	
is	a	whole	subject	to	influence	and	control.	The	firm	or	organization	engages	in	
activity	between	its	parts.	Economic	theory	of	the	firm	claims	this	to	be	efficient	
in	so	far	as	intra‐firm	activity	reduces	transaction	costs	(Coase,	1988).	However,	
intra‐firm	activity	creates	the	potential	for	the	actual	values	of	transactions	to	be	
attributed	to	different	parts	of	the	firm	to	concentrate	the	reporting	of	income	in	
particular	 places.	 This	 has	 tax	 consequences.	 The	 majority	 of	 income	 may	 be	
reported	in	one	tax	jurisdiction	to	the	detriment	of	another,	for	example,	country	
A	 rather	 than	B.	 Country	B	may	 then	 respond	by	 contesting	 the	 reporting	 and	
imposing	its	own	tax	rules,	creating	the	potential	for	double	taxation	of	the	same	
income.	Relatedly,	the	majority	of	income	may	be	reported	in	one	tax	jurisdiction	
rather	than	another	in	order	to	realise	a	tax	advantage	(reducing	the	total	tax	the	
firm	pays).		
A	 means	 was	 then	 required	 to	 assess	 how	 values	 for	 transactions	 are	
distributed	 between	 the	 entities,	 which	 could	 then	 be	 incorporated	 into	
agreements	between	tax	jurisdictions	(typically	countries).	In	response	a	family	
of	tests	has	been	developed	based	on	the	‘arm’s	length’	principle	(now	stated	as	
Article	9	of	the	OECD	model	convention).ii	The	principle	looks	at	the	transactions	
between	entities	that	form	part	of	an	organization	to	assess	whether	they	have	
price	 determination	 characteristics	 that	 one	 would	 expect	 based	 on	 a	 market	
situation.	There	is	an	immediate	contradiction	here.	If	intra‐firm	transactions	are	
intended	to	reduce	transaction	costs	because	of	the	internal	nature	of	the	relation,	
but	the	test	of	those	transactions	are	based	on	a	principle	that	the	values	ought	to	
reflect	 distanced	 market	 relations,	 then	 the	 very	 form	 of	 the	 principle	 is	
incoherent	from	the	point	of	view	of	theory	of	the	firm.iii		
Thereafter,	 the	arm’s	 length	principle	has	proved	both	conceptually	and	
practically	 problematic.	 The	 aim	 of	 the	 arm’s	 length	 principle	 is	 to	 assess	
transactions	in	comparison	to	the	value	that	would	be	created	by	a	market	price.	
Real	markets	 tend	 to	 be	 imperfect	 so	 the	 concept	 of	 an	 abstract	market	 price,	
implying	perfect	competition,	is	not	easily	invoked.	Moreover,	a	great	deal	of	the	
business	activity	in	real	economies	occurs	within	MNCs	and	through	their	supply	
chains	(more	than	60%	of	world	trade	according	to	the	OECD,	2002/2008).	Many	
transactions	 occur	 between	 oligopolistic	 MNCs,	 and/or	 involve	 the	
apportionment	of	uniquely	defined	values	based	on	 royalties	 for	 licensed	uses.	
Unique	 values	 in	 general	 create	 the	 problem	 of	 what	 is	 a	 value	 and	 how	 it	 is	
derived	–	particular	problems	for	intellectual	property,	intangible	assets	and	the	
digital	economy.	So,	not	only	is	it	typically	difficult	to	apply	a	practical	test	of	what	
a	 competitive	market	 price	would	 have	 been	 in	 a	 given	 case,	 the	 very	 form	of	
modern	economies	seem	to	be	developing	in	ways	that	exceed	the	capacity	of	the	
arm’s	length	principle	to	be	applied	effectively	(UK	HMRC,	2015a).	There	is	then	
great	 scope	 for	 MNCs	 to	 engage	 in	 forms	 of	 transfer	 pricing.	 Transfer	 pricing	
simply	means	the	allocation	of	values	or	prices	between	its	entities	in	a	chain	of	
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activity.	It	is	not	necessarily	manipulative	in	an	adverse	sense	but	clearly	creates	
the	opportunity	for	such	manipulation.			
Since	it	can	be	difficult	to	apply	the	arm’s	length	principle	it	can	be	difficult	
to	dispute	and	“correct”	where	income	is	reported	for	tax	purposes	(see	Kobetsky,	
2011:	pp.	394‐395).	The	problems	are	such	that	in	2008	Edward	Kleinbard,	then	
chief	of	staff	of	 the	US	Congress	 Joint	Committee	on	Taxation	characterised	the	
situation	 as	 dysfunctional,	 stating	 ‘transfer	 pricing	 enforcement	 is	 dead	 […]	
Despite	everyone’s	efforts	we’re	not	collecting	tax.	It’s	a	global	problem’	(Sullivan,	
2008:	p.	1;	also	Murphy,	2014,	Picciotto,	2011).		
		
Organizational	circuits,	global	wealth	chains,	and	tax	focused	coordination	
	
The	arm’s	length	issue	is	just	one	of	the	problems	arising	for	tax	law.	The	basic	
problem	 is	 that	 MNCs	 are	 capable	 of	 particular	 forms	 of	 coordination,	 and	
separate	entity	status	creates	incentives	for	coordination	to	become	focused	on	
tax.	MNCs	are	provided	with	incentives	to	develop	strategies	that	seek	to	minimise	
taxation	 through	 shifting	where	 sales,	 revenues	 and	 profits	 are	 reported.	 New	
entities	 are	 created	 in	particular	 localities	 and	 functions	 are	hived	off	 to	 those	
entities	 to	create	organizational	 circuits.	Organizational	circuit	 is	 intended	as	a	
convenient	descriptive	term	for	 the	connectivity	of	otherwise	separate	entities.	
Whatever	 functions	 some	 of	 the	 independent	 parts	 have,	 the	 whole	 is	 also	
configured	to	enable	the	minimisation	of	tax.	The	particular	forms	the	circuit	may	
take	serve	to	illustrate	Seabrooke	and	Wigan’s	(2014)	recent	call	to	develop	an	
understanding	of	global	wealth	chains	(GWC)	as	an	adjunct	to	the	more	common	
emphasis	on	global	value	chains.	Many	others	have	set	out	the	ways	in	which	the	
post‐Fordist	 period	 has	 involved	 the	 development	 of	 a	 variegated,	 unevenly	
developing	 neoliberalism	 (e.g.	 Peck,	 2013).	 Within	 this	 development	 one	 key	
feature	to	emerge	has	been	a	disaggregation	of	firm	activity,	spreading	out	across	
territories	 and	 involving	 different	 types	 of	 ownership	 and	 control,	 creating	 a	
global	value	chain	(Gereffi,	et	al,	2005).	Much	of	the	focus	of	work	on	global	value	
chains	 has	 explored	 the	 political	 economy	 of	 production.	 This	 tends	 to	 under‐
emphasise	the	movements	in	finance,	law	and	arising	strategies	and	practices	that	
are	also	developed.	That	is,	a	global	wealth	chain	or:																
	
“[T]he	 linked	 forms	 of	 capital	 seeking	 to	 avoid	 accountability	 during	
processes	of	pecuniary	wealth	creation.	By	accountability	we	mean	fiscal	
claims,	 legal	 obligations,	 or	 regulatory	 oversight…	 wealth	 chains	 are	
articulated	not	only	 through	cartographic	and	sovereign	spaces	but	also	
within	 financial	 products…	 Wealth	 chains	 hide,	 obscure	 and	 relocate	
wealth	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 they	 break	 loose	 from	 the	 location	 of	 value	
creation	and	heighten	inequality.”	(Seabrooke	and	Wigan,	2014:	p.	257)		
	
As	Seabrooke	and	Wigan	note,	these	are	the	‘yin	to	the	yang	of	value	chains’	(ibid).	
Value	chains	tend	to	 focus	on	 innovation	and	reorganization	of	production,	but	
MNCs	equally	seek	ways	to	reorganize	and	“innovate”	to	minimise	taxes	and	hide	
capital.	There	are	many	strategies	used	to	minimise	tax	and	the	specifics	of	these	
are	 constantly	 shifting	 (Kleinbard,	 2013).	 However,	 there	 are	 several	 common	
features	one	often	finds	in	strategies	using	organizational	circuits.	The	MNC	can:	
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1. Create	separate	entity	(A)	in	a	nodal	(meaning	of	central	importance	to	a	
network)	 location.	 This	 entity	 will	 be	 the	 one	 to	 which	 the	majority	 of	
income,	revenue,	and	profits	are	ultimately	channelled	for	reporting.	A	key	
characteristic	of	this	location	is	that	it	applies	little	or	no	corporation	tax.	
Historically	 such	 locations	 have	 also	 required	 minimal	 accounts	 be	
provided	to	the	jurisdiction’s	tax	authority	(the	firm	will	of	course	produce	
accounts	for	its	own	purposes).	These	locations	have	also	typically	resisted	
information	exchange	with	other	tax	authorities	(though	this	is	changing,	
see	later).	Entity	(A)	will	then	be	located	in	what	is	commonly	termed	a	tax	
haven	(see	Shaxson,	2011;	Zorome,	2007).	
2. Establish	separate	entity	(B)	in	a	locality	that	has	significant	tax	advantages	
relative	to	other	 locations.	The	MNC	does	so	based	on	an	analysis	of	 the	
relative	characteristics	of	the	multiple	locations	in	which	it	currently	does	
business,	and	any	related	locality	in	which	it	could	also	incorporate	(based,	
for	example,	on	the	need	to	be	within	a	given	administrative	or	trade	bloc).	
This	 advantage	 may	 be	 either	 a	 lower	 level	 of	 corporation	 tax	 or	 an	
amenable	government	willing	to	negotiate	a	specific	tax	arrangement	with	
the	MNC.iv	Crucially	(in	this	initial	generic	example),	this	locality	must	also	
allow	 reporting	 in	 the	 location	where	 (A)	has	been	 created,	providing	a	
channel	to	(A).			
3. Organize	 the	 different	 components	 in	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 production	 and	
administration	process	or	the	supply	chain	as	entities	(C)	(D)	(E)	etc.	The	
MNC	then	identifies	some	key	mechanism	through	which	the	majority	of	
values,	sales,	or	revenue	can	be	channelled	to	(B):	
 Simple	transfer	pricing.	For	example,	the	value	of	a	good	or	service	
can	 be	 minimised	 within	 entity	 (C)	 but	 its	 added	 value	 when	
ownership	is	transferred	(as	a	transaction)	to	(B)	can	be	maximised.	
This	minimises	tax	liability	in	the	higher	tax	regime	of	the	locality	of	
entity	(C).	The	process	can	be	repeated	for	(D)	(E)	etc	in	relation	to	
(B)	or	be	applied	along	a	chain	of	(D)	(E)	(F)	etc	to	get	to	(B).	This	is	
a	typical	strategy	with	commodities,	such	as	metals.		
 Sales	 completion.	 This	 involves	 differentiating	 between	 making	
sales	and	completing	sales.	Entity	(C)	is	designated	as	a	place	where	
sales	activity	may	occur	but	not	where	the	final	sale	is	completed.	
Sales	are	completed	in	(B)	or	in	another	entity	in	the	same	locality	
as	(B)	and	then	channelled	to	(B).	Again,	one	can	repeat	for	entities	
(D)	(E)	etc.	This	enables	the	concentration	of	the	reporting	of	sales	
and	hence	of	revenue	in	(B)	where	tax	is	minimised.	This	is	a	typical	
strategy	for	web‐based	sales.	
 Use	of	copyright,	branding,	trademarks	or	patented	items.	Entities	
(C)	(D)	(E)	etc	trade	under	the	name	of	a	single	organization	and	
each	 contracts	 to	 (B)	 under	 a	 licence	 to	 operate	 or	 pays	 some	
significant	proportion	of	 the	value	of	 transactions	as	a	 fee	 to	 (B),	
which	licences	the	use	of	the	name	and	any	related	paraphernalia.	
This	is	essentially	a	form	of	transfer	pricing.	The	fee	can	be	adjusted	
such	 that	 (C)	 (D)	 (E)	 report	 any	 given	 revenue	 for	 tax	 purposes,	
ranging	 from	a	 small	 profit	 to	 breaking‐even	or	 a	 reported	 loss.v	
Variations	of	this	strategy	can	be	used	by	many	different	kinds	of	
MNC.	 For	 example,	 a	manufacturer	 can	 differentiate	 its	 factories	
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from	a	parent	company	with	which	they	must	contract;	whilst	a	food	
and	beverage	chain	may	apply	fees	to	its	multiple	outlets	for	the	use	
of	the	trading	name	and	branded	products.					
4. Entity	(B)	 then	channels	some	significant	proportion	of	 its	concentrated	
income	to	entity	(A)	where	little	or	no	corporation	tax	is	paid	on	any	profit	
reported	 there.	 The	 tax	 authority	 of	 the	 locality	 of	 entity	 (B)	 may	 be	
satisfied	based	on	its	small	proportion	of	the	concentrated	revenue.	It	may	
also	 benefit	 from	 real	 investment	 and	 employment	 from	 the	 MNC	 in	
addition	to	its	role	in	facilitating	the	activity	of	(B).	The	channelling	from	
(B)	to	(A)	may	be	expedited	in	a	variety	of	ways.	For	example,	(A)	may	hold	
the	copyrights,	trademarks	etc	that	are	licensed	to	(B),	who	in	turn	licences	
all	other	entities.	Alternatively	(A)	may	provide	(B)	with	loans	and	so	(B)	
pays	interest	to	(A)	and	the	interest	effectively	transfers	the	profits	from	
(B)	to	(A).	This	principle	can	then	be	extended.	Rather	than	fund	dividend	
payments	to	shareholders	through	the	repatriation	of	profits,	which	then	
become	 subject	 to	 taxation,	 the	 MNC	 can	 retain	 its	 capital	 in	 offshore	
entities	and	fund	payments	through	bonds.								
		
Clearly,	there	is	great	scope	for	variation	in	regard	of	these	common	features.	The	
actual	form	may	involve	multiple	(B)s	or	no	(B)	at	all,	if	one	can	report	directly	to	
(A).	It	may	involve	no	(A)	in	the	sense	of	a	recognized	tax	haven,	simply	a	(B)	to	
minimise	tax.	The	numbers	and	purposes	of	(D)	(E)	etc	may	be	many	and	create	a	
bewildering	web	of	apparent	purposes	and	interlocking	ownerships.	However,	the	
emergent	point	is	simple.	Whatever	else	some	of	the	individual	entities	also	do,	
the	circuit	is	directed	at	the	exploitation	of	the	opportunity	to	minimise	tax.	There	
is	a	global	wealth	chain	effect.		
The	 technical	 term	 for	 the	 phenomenon	 of	 exploiting	 organizational	
circuits	 to	 reduce	 real	 taxation	 is	base	erosion	and	profit	 shifting	 (BEPS).	Base	
erosion	refers	to	the	reduction	in	the	total	revenues	that	ought	otherwise	to	be	
reported	 for	 tax	purposes	 (the	 tax	base).	Profit	 shifting	 facilitates	a	divergence	
between	headline	rates	of	taxation	and	real	or	effective	rates.	The	OECD	states	the	
BEPS	problem	as:	
	
Over	 time,	 the	 current	 rules	 have	 also	 revealed	weaknesses	 that	 create	
opportunities	 for	 BEPS.	 BEPS	 relates	 chiefly	 to	 instances	 where	 the	
interaction	of	different	tax	rules	leads	to	double	non‐taxation	or	less	than	
single	 taxation.	 It	 also	 relates	 to	 arrangements	 that	 achieve	 no	 or	 low	
taxation	by	shifting	profits	away	from	the	jurisdictions	where	the	activities	
creating	those	profits	take	place.	No	or	low	taxation	is	not	per	se	a	cause	of	
concern,	 but	 it	 becomes	 so	 when	 it	 is	 associated	 with	 practices	 that	
artificially	segregate	taxable	income	from	the	activities	that	generate	it.	In	
other	words,	what	creates	tax	policy	concerns	 is	that,	due	to	gaps	in	the	
interaction	 of	 different	 tax	 systems,	 and	 in	 some	 cases	 because	 of	 the	
application	 of	 bilateral	 tax	 treaties,	 income	 from	 cross‐border	 activities	
may	go	untaxed	anywhere,	or	be	only	unduly	lowly	taxed.	(OECD,	2013:	p.	
10)	
	
Note	that	the	OECD	focuses	the	problem	on	the	existence	of	disjunctions	 in	 tax	
treaties	and	systems.	The	development	of	organizational	circuits	has	meant	that	
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the	original	chief	concern	with	double‐taxation	has	 today	become	a	recognized	
problem	of	 radical	 reduction	 in	 tax	payments	and,	 in	 the	extreme,	double	non‐
taxation	(Kleinbard,	2011).		This	has	acquired	its	own	language	of	legitimacy	and	
distinctions.	The	erstwhile	taxpayer	refers	to	their	conduct	as	tax	planning	for	tax	
efficiency.	The	tax	authorities	distinguish	between	legal	tax	avoidance	and	illegal	
tax	evasion.	
	 Note	the	terms	avoidance	and	tax	haven	are	contextual.	One	must	use	each	
advisedly.	Avoidance	may	be	legal	but	it	can	also	involve	degrees	of	 ‘risk’,	since	
the	strategy	may	be	open	to	challenge	because	of	how	it	is	positioned.	The	very	
existence	of	the	arm’s	length	principle	means	that	some	aspects	of	a	strategy	could	
be	contested.	With	this	in	mind	senior	advisor	to	the	Tax	Justice	Network,	David	
Quentin,	makes	the	case	that	avoidance	blends	into	evasion	along	a	continuum,	
but	in	a	clearly	discernible	way	based	on	the	intent	and	awareness	of	the	client	
and	tax	advisor	(Quentin,	2014).	The	intent	is	to	‘mine	risk’	or	knowingly	deprive	
the	tax	authority	of	tax	that	could	be	paid.	However,	the	organization	is	still	using	
and	relying	on	the	law.	There	is	also,	what	Sharman	(2010)	refers	to	as	‘calculated	
ambiguity’.	The	very	nature	of	the	law	enables	an	organization	to	be	two	things	at	
once	(loss	making	and	profitable).	Concomitantly,	whilst	there	is	a	common	sense	
reference	point	for	the	term	tax	haven,	all	countries	can	be	tax	havens	in	relation	
to	 some	 other	 (see	 Picciotto,	 1992).	 Moreover,	 use	 of	 the	 term	 can	 give	 the	
impression	 that	 it	 is	 only	 a	 small	 number	 of	 localities	 that	 are	 problematic.	
However,	highly	visible	sites	such	as	the	Cayman	Islands	are	merely	destinations	
and	many	 other	 sites	 play	 roles	 in	 flows	 of	 capital,	 not	 least	 the	world’s	main	
financial	centres	(see	Palan	et	al	2010).								
		
The	consequences	of	tax‐focused	coordination	
	
The	existence	of	separate	entity	status	and	a	reliance	on	procedures	such	as	the	
arm’s	 length	 principle	 mean	 that	 the	 opportunity	 to	 create	 and	 exploit	
organizational	circuits	to	achieve	tax	avoidance	persists	within	a	process.	There	is	
a	context	issue	here	where	the	structural	flaw	has,	so	far,	limited	the	way	in	which	
the	problem	of	avoidance	is	addressed.				
	
Once	tax	law	is	based	on	separate	entity	status	then	a	process	is	set	in	motion.	The	
individual	state	is	forced	to	respond	to	the	potential	for	tax	leakages	by	seeking	to	
address	the	specifics	of	tax	strategies,	and	must	do	so	based	on	agreements	with	
other	states.	Tax	law	becomes	a	proliferation	of	detailed	responses	to	tax	planning	
and	 of	 numbers	 of	 tax	 treaties	 with	 different	 states.	 There	 are,	 for	 example,	
currently	more	than	3,000	double	taxation	treaties	in	existence.	Complexity	arises	
because	of	the	need	to	substantiate	separate	entity	status	and	because	of	the	need	
for	information	disclosure	regarding	the	transactions	between	entities	in	different	
tax	localities.			
States,	 of	 course,	 are	 not	 innocent	 in	 this	 process.	 Once	 the	 system	 is	
structured	around	the	separation	of	entities,	states	have	motivations	to	compete	
for	tax	revenues,	creating	the	potential	for	each	to	adjust	their	tax	law	in	order	to	
attract	not	only	economic	activity	but	also	the	reporting	of	revenues	and	profits.	
MNCs	respond	by	‘treaty	shopping’,	creating	a	form	of	arbitrage.	The	problem	is	
further	compounded	by	some	states	and	localities	opting	for	an	extreme	form	of	
specialisation,	 becoming	 destinations	 commonly	 recognized	 as	 tax	 havens,	 but	
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within	 a	 broader	 process	 of	 commercialization	 of	 sovereignty	 (Palan,	 2002),	
which	 is	 itself	 a	 process	 within	 the	 changing	 architecture	 of	 neoliberalism	
(Brenner	et	al,	2010).	It	is	important	also	to	note	that	MNCs	may	not	simply	be	
opportunistic.	They	and	the	accountancy	and	consultancy	firms	they	employ	may	
also	seek	to	shape	the	law	and	can	be	active	agents	of	its	administration	(Sikka	
and	Wilmott,	2010,	2013;	Sikka,	2015).	They	are	part	of	the	process.		
For	 example,	 the	 OECD	 is	 the	 major	 source	 of	 expertise,	 regulatory	
proposals	 and	 mechanisms	 for	 international	 tax	 law.	 International	 tax	 law	 is	
highly	specialised	and	so	the	OECD	tends	to	draw	its	personnel	from	a	limited	pool,	
essentially	 dominated	 by	 the	 major	 accountancy	 and	 consultancy	MNCs.	 Most	
countries	 have	 developed	 local	 “generally	 accepted	 accounting	 principles”	
(GAAP),	which	are	included	in	relevant	statutes.	It	is	the	task	of	the	International	
Accounting	Standards	Board		(IASB)	to	harmonise	these	local	GAAPs	through	its	
International	Financial	Reporting	Standards	(IFRS)	Foundation.	The	Foundation	
is	dependent	on	the	same	limited	pool	of	expertise	as	the	OECD.	There	is	then	a	
permanent	problem	of	group‐think	based	on	expertise,	as	well	as	the	potential	for	
conflicts	of	interest	and	policy	capture.			
One	 can	 of	 course	 overstate	 the	 point	 here	 (see	 Eccleston	 et	 al	 2015;	
Woodward,	2004).	Competitive	complexity	does	not	simply	result	in	a	system	that	
always	 and	 everywhere	 promotes	 tax	 avoidance.	 There	 are	 also	
countertendencies.	States	must	respond	to	public	pressure	and	also	have	a	basic	
interest	in	maintaining	their	tax	base.	States	are	neither	unitary	nor	necessarily	
the	product	of	single	sets	of	interests.	The	well‐publicised	“Double	Irish”,	“Dutch	
Sandwich”	and	the	recently	exposed	tax	practices	in	Luxembourg	are	all	based	on	
variations	of	the	organizational	circuit	set	out	in	the	previous	section.	A	US	Senate	
committee	report	in	2013	sets	out	the	ways	in	which	Apple	allegedly	used	a	series	
of	entities	focused	on	Ireland	to	minimise	tax	(Levin,	2013).vi	Under	pressure	from	
the	US	government	the	Irish	government	has	stated	that	it	will	not	facilitate	some	
forms	of	tax	avoidance.	Quite	what	that	will	mean	is	not	yet	clear	in	2015.	One	of	
the	 controversial	 aspects	 of	 activity	 in	 Ireland	 has	 been	 the	 negotiation	 of	
confidential	 tax	 arrangements	 with	MNCs	 by	 the	 state.	 The	 existence	 of	 these	
kinds	of	arrangements	can	constitute	“selective	advantage”	and	this	violates	EU	
law	regarding	free	and	fair	competition.	The	EU	has	pursued	numerous	cases,	for	
example,	an	arrangement	between	Starbucks	and	the	Netherlands	and	Fiat	and	
Luxembourg	(EC,	2014;	Barker	and	Houlder,	2014).vii		
Final	rulings	on	many	of	these	cases	have	yet	to	be	made,	including	Apple	
in	Ireland,	and	the	EC	Competition	Commissioner,	Margrethe	Vestager,	recently	
noted	that	delays	have	been	partly	due	to	lack	of	cooperation	from	the	relevant	
countries	(Waterfield,	2015).	More	broadly,	structure	as	context	also	matters	for	
the	general	tendency	(see	EC,	2015:	pp.	15‐16	for	the	limits	on	the	authority	of	the	
competition	 commissioner).	 Institutions	 limit	 the	 scope	 of	 any	 constructive	
countertendency	 that	 addresses	 tax	 avoidance.	 The	 OECD	 approach	 to	 BEPS	
identifies	the	issue	as	one	of	disjunctions	in	tax	treaties	and	systems.	The	focus	on	
given	 cases	 of	 alleged	 avoidance	 invites	 a	 case‐by‐case	 approach	 and	 selecting	
cases	is	not	simple,	since	there	are	many	millions	of	transactions	between	MNCs	
and	there	are	MNCs	active	in	many	states.	So,	there	is	an	issue	of	complexity	in	
terms	of	the	sheer	number	of	possible	transaction	pricing	problems	and	selective	
advantage	agreements.	Furthermore,	a	case‐by‐case	approach	tends	to	orient	on	
more	visible	cases	and	necessarily	entails	dispute	for	each	case.	As	Ms	Vestager	
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also	recently	noted	“We	cannot	do	every	case	in	the	world,	but	we	can	find	cases	
that	 we	 think	 are	 deeply	 problematic”,	 (Waterfield,	 2015).	 A	 case‐by‐case	
approach	 requires	 investigation,	 information	 gathering,	 and	 perhaps	 lengthy	
litigation.	The	process	is	resource	intensive.	One	may	close	loopholes	and	some	
tax	avoidance	may	cease.	Equally,	the	form	may	mutate.	It	may	do	so	because	the	
existence	of	separate	entity	status	and	a	reliance	on	procedures	such	as	the	arm’s	
length	principle	mean	that	 the	opportunity	to	create	and	exploit	organizational	
circuits	persists.			
	The	point	to	emphasise	is	that	it	is	the	perpetuation	of	the	deep	structural	
flaw	constituted	by	separate	entity	status	that	is	at	the	heart	of	the	problem	(again	
see	Picciotto,	2011).	The	system	is	one	that	is	fundamentally	distorted.	It	creates	
perverse	incentives	and	can	also	produce	harmful	net	outcomes.	If	coordination	
by	MNCs	is	focused	around	tax	planning	as	a	focus	of	“efficiency”	then	decision‐
making	may	not	reflect	the	degree	to	which	the	MNC	is	actually	rooted	in	business	
activity	 in	 real	 economies	 in	 particular	 localities.	 The	 organization	 is	 able	 to	
benefit	from	Sharman’s	calculated	ambiguity	and	a	global	wealth	chain	effect	may	
result.	If	so,	a	kind	of	low‐commitment	capitalism	emerges.viii	The	MNC	minimises	
its	footprint	and	socio‐economic	contribution.	Individual	states	then	experience	
net	losses	of	potential	tax	revenue,	and	because	of	the	existence	of	tax	havens	and	
competition	between	states,	this	becomes	a	net	loss	to	all	states.	National	firms	
and	 any	 firm	 that	 chooses	 to	 be	 more	 responsible	 are	 put	 at	 a	 competitive	
disadvantage,	and	so	the	very	system	militates	against	any	single	national	firm	or	
MNC	 choosing	 to	 act	more	 responsibly.	When	 this	 becomes	 visible	 it	 has	 two	
further	effects.	First,	it	corrodes	the	general	legitimacy	of	taxation,	and	this	may	
result	in	conformity	to	the	same	types	of	behaviours.	The	socio‐economic	context	
becomes	one	pervaded	by:	if	corporations	don’t	pay	their	taxes	why	should	I?	This	
encourages	a	grey	economy	as	well	as	populist	backlashes	against	particular	firms,	
whilst	 the	 general	 problem	 persists.	 Second,	 revenue	 losses	 undermine	 the	
capacity	of	the	state	to	fund	public	services,	and	address	problems	of	the	business	
cycle	 through	 fiscal	 policy	 without	 creating	 further	 debt.	 This	 has	 been	
particularly	 noticeable	 during	 the	 Great	 Recession	 that	 followed	 the	 Global	
Financial	Crisis.ix														
	 As	noted	 in	 the	 introduction,	 there	 are	many	eye‐catching	 statistics	one	
might	 call	 attention	 to	 here.x	 Furthermore,	 many	 prominent	 cases	 have	 been	
reported	 in	 recent	 years.	 In	 2012	 the	 UK	House	 of	 Commons	 Public	 Accounts	
Committee	 called	 Google,	 Amazon	 and	 Starbucks	 as	 witnesses	 in	 a	 broader	
investigation	into	corporate	taxation	(HCCCPA,	2012).	A	follow	up	report	focusing	
particularly	 on	 Google	 highlighted	 that	 between	 2006	 and	 2011	 the	 firm	
generated	revenue	from	the	UK	of	US$18	billion	whilst	paying	the	equivalent	of	
US$16	million	 in	 corporation	 tax	over	 the	 same	period	 (HCCCPA,	2013:	p.	15).	
According	 to	 Zucman	 (2014)	 Google’s	 combined	 effective	 tax	 rate	 on	 profits	
outside	the	US	(not	just	the	UK)	has	varied	over	the	last	few	years	from	2%	to	8%.	
The	subsequent	popular	backlash	saw	Google	pay	£20	million	in	UK	corporation	
tax	 in	2013‐14	(Starbucks	also	notably	committed	itself	 to	paying	£20	million).	
The	payment,	however,	was	on	sales	generated	by	UK	clients	of	£3.4	billion;	the	
effective	tax	rate	that	follows	is	ambiguous	and	may	be	as	low	as	1%	(Duke,	2014).	
The	sudden	shift	under	public	scrutiny	to	greater	tax	payments	serves	to	reinforce	
the	perception	that	for	MNCs	such	payments	are	arbitrary.	This	makes	addressing	
a	state’s	tax	gap	more	difficult.	The	tax	gap	is	the	difference	between	what	the	tax	
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authority	projects	it	should	collect	in	revenues	within	the	tax	year	and	what	it	is	
actually	able	to	collect	–	the	gap	is	a	residual	deriving	from	a	grey	economy,	lost	
corporation	tax,	evasion	etc.xi	The	last	estimate	in	the	UK	by	HMRC	was	for	the	
financial	 year	 2012‐13,	 and	 put	 the	 tax	 gap	 at	 £34	 billion	 (Aldrick,	 2014a).	
Independent	 calculations	 using	 a	 broader	 measure	 of	 forms	 of	 tax	 avoidance	
produce	higher	estimates	that	can	be	double	this	figure	(see	Sikka	and	Willmott,	
2013).	Collection	based	on	these	figures	would	reduce	the	potential	budget	deficit	
and	this	is	something	all	UK	political	parties	now	publically	acknowledge.	
The	system	of	MNC	taxation	 is	distorted	and	 these	distortions	have	real	
consequences.	 They	 feed	 into	 a	 broader	 economic	 and	 social	 context.	 Public	
outrage	is	not	created	because	MNCs	break	the	law,	but	rather	because	they	do	
not	need	to	break	the	law	in	order	to	pay	little	or	no	tax.	Pointedly	they	can	choose	
to	do	so.	This	does,	however,	have	further	consequences	for	firms.	It	can	create	
serious	“reputational”	damage	for	the	individual	firm	and	for	business	in	general.	
This	is	also	a	general	issue	of	the	loss	of	trust	(see	Colledge	et	al	2014).	This	loss	
is	reflected	in	the	Institute	for	Business	Ethics	annual	Ipsos/MORI	survey	of	public	
attitudes	 towards	 business.	 The	 survey	 identifies	 tax	 avoidance	 as	 the	 most	
important	issue	that	ought	to	be	addressed	by	business	(IBE,	2013:	p.	2).		
	
Unitary	taxation	as	a	solution		
	
If	the	root	cause	of	the	problems	is	a	deep	structural	flaw	then	the	ideal	solution	
is	to	address	the	flaw.	This	implies	agreement	to	create	universal,	coherent	and	
binding	 international	 tax	 law	 that	 is	 not	 based	 on	 separate	 entity	 status.	 This	
means	 treating	 the	 entire	MNC	 as	 a	 single	 entity	 for	 tax	 purposes.	 That	 entity	
produces	one	 set	 of	master	 accounts,	 and	 thus	one	ultimate	 income	and	profit	
statement.	The	accounts	are	reported	to	a	designated	tax	authority.	A	proportion	
of	the	profit	is	then	allocated	to	individual	states	based	on	some	universally	agreed	
formula.	 The	 formula	 is	 constructed	 to	 represent	 real	 economic	 activity	 or	
presence	 in	 given	 localities.	 The	 formula	 typically	 includes	measures	 of	 assets,	
employment	and	sales.	It	includes	these	measures	since	each	may	be	represented	
to	different	degrees	in	different	localities.	Once	the	profit	is	apportioned	between	
relevant	states	then	the	sum	allocated	becomes	subject	to	corporation	tax	in	that	
locality.	
	 The	approach	is	termed	unitary	taxation	based	on	formula	apportionment	
(see	Picciotto,	2014;	Kobetsky,	2011).	 In	 its	 ideal	 form	 it	 renders	manipulative	
transfer	pricing	redundant.	It	removes	the	incentive	to	shift	nominal	operations	
into	 different	 jurisdictions,	 since	 there	 is	 no	 immediate	 advantage	 to	 doing	 so.	
Reporting	 strategies	 resulting	 in	 profit	 shifting	 would	 not	 affect	 actual	
apportionment,	 since	 unitary	 taxation	 is	 based	 on	 a	 common	 standardised	
measure.	 Firms	 may	 still	 choose	 to	 shift	 their	 real	 investment	 and	 economic	
activity,	but	would	no	longer	have	an	incentive	to	create	organizational	circuits	
that	simply	shift	where	reporting	occurs.	As	a	result,	firm	decision‐making	would	
be	focused	more	on	economic	efficiency	than	on	a	distorted	sense	of	tax	efficiency.	
This	 in	 turn	 would	 provide	 one	 avenue	 through	 which	 low‐commitment	
capitalism	 might	 be	 addressed.	 Concomitantly	 the	 pressures	 on	 states	 to	
accommodate	MNCs	would	qualitatively	alter.	There	might	still	be	the	potential	
for	 tax	 competition	 in	 order	 to	 attract	 investment	 and	 employment,	 but	 there	
would	be	no	pressure	 to	 tacitly	 facilitate	 tax	avoidance	 in	ways	 that	 create	net	
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losses	 to	 all	 states.	 The	 consequences	 of	 double	 non‐taxation	 would	 also	 be	
obviated.	For	example,	the	practice	of	accumulating	funds	in	tax	havens,	which	the	
MNC	then	resists	repatriating,	would	no	longer	have	an	organizational	basis.	Tax	
havens	 would	 thus	 begin	 to	 whither	 since	 one	 of	 their	 functions	 would	 be	
curtailed.		
Standardisation	 would	 mean	 that	 the	 basis	 of	 treaty	 shopping	 would	
dissolve.	As	such,	the	dynamics	of	the	current	system	in	which	MNCs	play	off	states	
against	each	other	would	be	altered.	This	would	be	a	structural	transformation.	It	
would	 transcend	 the	 problems	 of	 the	 case‐by‐case	 loophole	 approach.	 The	
loophole	 approach	 tends	 to	 focus	 on	 particular	 companies	 and	 specific	
behaviours.	Since	a	separate	entity	system	continues	to	foster	the	opportunity	for	
tax	avoidance	it	creates	the	permanent	potential	for	more	cases	and	for	continued	
corrosion	of	the	general	legitimacy	of	taxation,	as	well	as	problems	of	loss	of	trust	
that	 extend	 further	 than	 the	 activity	 of	 the	 particular	 corporation.	 A	 unitary	
approach	has	the	advantage	of	reducing	the	specific	and	personalised	nature	of	
critique	of	corporations	and	the	generalised	impacts	this	creates.		
A	unitary	approach	affects	the	individual	corporation	but	does	so	through	
the	generalised	impact	on	the	structural	dynamics	of	the	tax	system.	It	contributes	
to	a	recovery	of	sovereignty	for	the	state	and	it	changes	the	context	of	dialogue	
between	corporations	and	critics.	This	is	important	because	the	current	terms	of	
dialogue	are	an	impediment	to	constructive	change.	Any	reading	of	the	transcripts	
of	 UK	 and	US	 government	 hearings	 on	 the	 subject	makes	 this	 clear.	 Particular	
corporations	 are	 called	 as	 witnesses	 regarding	 tax	 avoidance	 and	 come	 with	
prepared	statements	and	legal	representation.	An	impasse	typically	results.		Well‐
intentioned	 interlocutors	 engage	 in	 moralising,	 which	 also	 raises	 their	 media	
profile.	 Criticised	 corporations	 tend	 to	 fall	 back	 on	 the	 claim	 that	 they	 pay	 all	
legally	required	 taxes.	For	example,	Eric	Schmidt	executive	chairman	of	Google	
stated	in	response	to	public	criticism	of	Google’s	tax	behaviour	in	the	UK:	“It	is	not	
up	to	the	taxee	to	say	how	much	tax	to	pay.	Figure	out	what	taxes	you	want	to	
charge	us	and	we	will	pay	them.	The	fact	of	the	matter	is:	what	we	are	doing	is	
legal,”	(Arlidge	and	Ungoed‐Thomas,	2013).xii	
This	variety	of	reply	is	limited,	and	one	that	corporations	often	make.	It	is	
limited	because	tax	avoidance	is	by	definition	legal.	The	reply	is	thus	at	a	tangent	
to	the	concerns	that	provoke	critique	from	politicians	and	the	public.	Tax	practices	
based	on	organizational	circuits	are	not	simply	following	the	law.	They	involve	a	
process	of	shaping	organizational	activity	to	make	use	of	the	law.	Tax	avoidance	is	
intentional	activity.	The	MNC	is	not	a	passive	recipient	of	a	tax	bill	based	on	its	
economic	 activity.	 The	MNC	makes	 choices	 and	 these	 are	 reflected	 in	different	
inflections	to	general	 legal	 fallback	statements.	There	 is	a	significant	difference	
between	the	statement	“we	paid	all	legally	required	taxes”	and	“we	structured	our	
practices	to	minimise	the	taxes	we	paid”.	In	the	former	one	is	following	the	law	in	
a	neutral	sense	and	the	implication	is	that	the	law	had	resulted	in	a	determining	
and	universal	practice	and	outcome	(the	MNC	is	a	passive	recipient).	In	the	latter,	
following	the	 law	becomes	leading	the	 law	to	places	one	can	take	 it	 in	order	to	
exploit	a	potential.	This	latter	sense	begins	from	an	adversarial	relation	between	
the	 corporation,	 the	 law,	 the	 polity	 and	 the	 public.	 It	 tacitly	 assumes	 that	 the	
default	position	of	the	corporation	is	to	pay	no	tax	using	the	law	as	a	medium	for	
this,	since	this	is	what	one	would	do	if	not	prevented	(see	Morgan,	2011).	This	is	
a	position	entirely	at	odds	with	contemporary	business	tropes:	good	governance,	
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corporate	 social	 responsibility	and	corporate	 citizenship.	Yet	 it	 is	 intrinsic	 to	a	
legalistic	response	to	issues	of	tax	avoidance.	It	thus	stands	at	odds	with	many	of	
the	claims	the	same	corporations	may	make	in	other	contexts.	
The	 point	 to	 emphasise	 is	 that	 a	 unitary	 approach	 to	 corporation	 tax	
removes	 the	basis	 through	which	contradiction	arises.	 	Unitary	taxation	can	be	
part	 of	 a	 credible	 approach	 to	 restoring	 trust.	 It	 places	 corporate	 activity	 in	 a	
different	 context.	 It	 provides	 an	 institutional	 basis	 that	 removes	 some	
opportunities	for	practices	that	undermine	ethical	conduct.	The	impasse	between	
moralising	and	legalism	is	thus	potentially	transcended.	As	such,	unitary	taxation	
provides	 a	 genuine	 basis	 for	 ethical	 conduct	 to	 play	 a	more	 consistent	 role	 in	
corporate	decision‐making	and	thus	in	economic	activity.			
	To	be	clear,	however,	unitary	taxation	does	not	guarantee	that	ethics	will	
play	such	a	role.	It	merely	creates	a	more	conducive	environment	because	some	
forms	 of	 behaviour	 are	 denied	 to	 the	 firm	 (see	 Lawson,	 2015).	 There	 is	 still	 a	
difference	between	denying	an	avenue	for	some	forms	of	behaviour	and	changing	
the	perspective	of	 firms	in	regard	of	their	behaviour.	Concomitantly,	 it	remains	
the	 case	 that	 there	 is	 a	 significant	 difference	 between	 a	 tax	 system	 in	 which	
compliance	must	be	compelled	and	one	 in	which	cooperation	 is	given,	and	this	
also	applies	to	a	unitary	system.	MNCs	may	still	seek	to	subvert	the	system.	The	
OECD	recognizes	that	voluntary	compliance	is	a	cornerstone	of	effective	taxation.	
This	is	clearly	stated	in	its	Principles	of	Good	Tax	Administration	(OECD,	2001).	The	
implication	 is	 that	 the	 socialisation	 of	 firms	 and	 the	 creation	 of	 constructive	
cultures	 matters.	 This	 is	 something	 that	 new	 research	 in	 economics	 and	
organizations	increasingly	recognizes	for	tax	issues.	Until	recently	a	rational	actor	
model	dominated	theory	and	research	(based	on	Allingham	and	Sandmo,	1972).	
However,	 there	 is	 now	 a	 growing	 focus	 on	 reconceptualising	 tax‐related	
behaviour	 and	 exploring	 different	 ways	 to	 socialise	 or	 incentivise	 compliance.	
This	 work	 comes	 under	 the	 general	 heading	 of	 ‘tax	 morale’	 (see	 Lutmer	 and	
Singhal,	 2014).	 It	 recognizes	 that	 there	 is	 more	 to	 tax	 related	 behaviour	 than	
simple	economic	rationality.	The	OECD	also	recognizes	the	value	of	this	work	(see	
OECD,	2013b).		
	
Though	 unitary	 taxation	 provides	 a	 constructive	 context	 for	 change	 it	 is	 not	
without	its	problems	and	its	critics	(see	Fleming	Jr.	et	al,	2014;	Roin,	2008;	Morse,	
2008).	However,	there	are	responses	to	the	main	points	of	critique.	No	system	is	
perfect,	including	unitary	taxation.	The	real	issue	is	what	set	of	problems	would	
one	prefer	to	be	dealing	with	and	when	in	the	process	of	reform	is	it	appropriate	
to	be	doing	so?	Unitary	taxation	creates	an	initial	challenge	in	terms	of	establishing	
clear	 rules	 for	 the	 application	 of	 an	 apportionment	 formula	 (see	 Cobham	 and	
Lopez,	2014).	But	its	historical	record	should	not	confuse	the	potential	of	unitary	
taxation.	Historically,	unitary	taxation	has	been	implemented	within	the	US	and	
Canada,	where	different	states	and	provinces	have	sought	to	address	problems	of	
corporations	 with	 entities	 in	 several	 states	 and	 provinces	 (different	 tax	
jurisdictions).	More	than	40	US	states	use	versions	of	unitary	taxation,	and	many	
of	 these	 were	 developed	 separately	 and	 so	 vary	 in	 detail.	 Since	 1967	 the	 US	
Multistate	Commission	has	worked	to	encourage	uniformity	among	the	versions.	
Many	of	the	problems	experienced	are	concerned	with	rendering	the	separately	
developed	 systems	 commensurate,	 so	 problems	 are	 historically	 cumulative.	
However,	the	broader	potential	of	unitary	taxation	concerns	collective	agreement	
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for	a	 single	agreed	 formula	and	set	of	 implementation	mechanisms.	 Its	natural	
context	is	as	a	global	or	regional	international	response	to	the	practices	of	MNCs.	
Moreover,	unitary	taxation	is	not	antithetical	to	the	use	of	complementary	policies	
that	address	related	issues	for	taxation	(e.g.	the	potential	for	race	to	the	bottom	
effects	 on	 tax	 rates	 between	 states).	 It	 need	 not	 stand	 alone.	 In	 any	 case,	
identifying	problems	of	disjoints	 in	actually	existing	systems	within	 federalised	
states	 is	not	quite	 the	appropriate	context	 in	which	 to	consider	 its	appeal.	The	
primary	 problem	 is	 tax	 lost	 across	 international	 borders.	Moreover,	 the	major	
advantage	of	a	unitary	approach	in	an	international	context	is	that	it	frontloads	
agreement	and	cooperation.	This	is	actually	the	reverse	of	the	standard	sceptical	
critique.	Achieving	agreement	is	a	hurdle	but	it	is	one	that	is	actually	built	into	the	
very	terms	of	unitary	taxation	as	an	international	solution.			
To	be	clear,	a	unitary	tax	solution	cannot	simply	dispense	with	all	possible	
problems.	 It	 cannot	 be	 divorced	 from	 the	 political	 economy	 in	 which	 it	 is	
embedded.	 It	 is	not	 immune	to	the	structural	power	of	capital.	For	example,	as	
previously	noted,	unitary	taxation	potentially	recovers	the	sovereignty	of	the	state	
vis‐à‐vis	 the	 corporation.	 However,	 though	 corporations	 would	 find	 it	 more	
difficult	to	continue	to	develop	loopholes	in	relation	to	transfer	pricing,	they	could	
lobby	for	concessions	and	exemptions	in	a	unitary	system.	But	any	constructive	
change	 to	 how	 corporations	 are	 taxed	 confronts	 these	 issues	 of	 power	 –	 and	
corporate	 lobbying	 is	 not	 the	 only	 source	 of	 political	 influence	 or	 agency	 for	
political	will.	Awareness	matters	in	so	far	as	it	creates	scope	for	solutions	to	be	
worked	 towards	 and	 implemented,	 often	 in	 incremental	 ways.	 One	 cannot	 be	
supportive	 of	 options	 one	 does	 not	 know	 about,	 and	 such	 options	 cannot	 gain	
momentum	unless	 they	are	supported.	 It	 is	 for	 this	 reason	 that	 the	Tax	 Justice	
Network,	typically	positions	its	interventions	in	terms	of	cumulative	momentum	
for	 constructive	 change	 (see	 Spencer,	 2013;	 also,	 Seabrooke	 and	Wigan,	 2013;	
CRC,	2014).	Neither	the	state	nor	the	global	political	economy	and	its	institutions	
are	deterministic.	Various	policy	 trends	are	also	significant	here	 in	 two	senses.	
The	failures	or	limits	of	some	policies	seem	likely	to	create	additional	momentum	
for	further	change,	and	there	are	also	some	more	wide‐ranging	changes	that	are,	
incrementally,	gaining	traction.		
		
Current	policy	trends	
	
Popular	focus	on	the	problem	of	MNC	tax	has	grown	since	the	financial	crisis	and	
so	politicians	have	more	prominently	acknowledged	the	issue.	This	has	occurred	
within	the	G8(7)	and	G20,	both	of	whom	‘call	on’	or	delegate	the	development	of	
policy	to	the	OECD.	Solutions	arising	from	the	OECD,	including	the	BEPS	project,	
however,	do	not	 fully	commit	 to	a	unitary	approach.	 Instead	there	has	been	an	
amalgam	 of	 individual	 policy	 formulations.	 In	 the	 summer	 of	 2014	 the	 G‐20	
adopted	several	OECD	initiatives.	Specifically,	members	committed	themselves	to	
requiring	MNCs	by	2017	to	engage	in	country	by	country	reporting	of	revenue,	
profit	 and	 actual	 tax	 paid	 (see	 OECD,	 2015).	 Country	 by	 country	 reporting	
provides	for	more	comparative	information	and	transparency	regarding	the	real	
financial	activity	of	MNCs.	
Country	by	country	reporting	is	a	significant	change	(again	see	Eccleston	
et	al,	2015).	It	improves	the	flow	of	information	and	thus	makes	it	easier	to	identify	
and	 address	 tax	 avoidance	 and	 prosecute	 tax	 evasion.	 However,	 it	 does	 not	
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address	the	fundamental	context	in	which	tax	avoidance	and	evasion	occur.	The	
MNC	 can	 still	 be	motivated	 to	 construct	 organizational	 circuits,	 since	 separate	
entity	status	and	the	arm’s	length	principle	still	apply.	The	whole	is	still	subject	to	
resource	 intensive	 case‐by‐case	 responses	 that	 lead	 to	 problems	 of	 iterative	
complexity	and	institutional	or	strategic	mutations	as	the	MNC	seeks	to	minimise	
tax.	There	 is	still	a	substantive	difference	 in	comparison	to	a	unitary	approach.	
Media	reports	of	prominent	politicians	announcing	the	end	of	transfer	pricing	and	
of	tax	havens	may	well	be	premature	(e.g.	Aldrick,	2014b	and	2014c;	Mostrous,	
2014).	
Though	reports	are	perhaps	premature,	the	latest	OECD	BEPS	action	plan	
released	 in	 October	 2015	 can	 also	 be	 interpreted	 as	 incremental	 reform	 to	 a	
flawed	 process,	 one	 that	 represents	 the	 relative	 success	 of	 campaigners	 in	
maintaining	pressure	on	states.	There	are	also	specific	legal	initiatives	that	may	
ultimately	serve	as	an	institutional	basis	for	a	more	constructive	socialisation	of	
MNC	behaviour.xiii	Many	 states	now	have	versions	of	 a	General	Anti‐Avoidance	
Rule	(GAAR)	inscribed	in	statute.	A	GAAR	creates	a	principle	in	law	that	rejects	the	
claim	that	strategies	that	lead	to	avoidance	are	acceptable	simply	because	they	are	
legal.	Rather	the	legality	can	be	questioned	because	of	the	purpose	of	the	strategy.	
A	GAAR	was	introduced	into	the	UK	2013	Finance	Act.			
Introducing	a	GAAR	provides	a	way	for	courts	to	‘look	through’	the	activity	
of	MNCs	and	assess	the	nature	and	intent	of	strategies	in	context.	This	could	allow	
GAAR	to	be	used	to	reject	strategies	that	are	ostensibly	legal	and	this	might	serve	
as	a	deterrent	to	MNCs.	Over	time	this	could	form	part	of	the	institutional	basis	of	
a	different	socialisation	for	MNCs.	However,	the	current	GAAR	in	the	UK	combines	
ambiguity	and	a	specific	limiting	of	its	coverage.	The	current	focus	of	the	UK	GAAR	
is	tax	abuse	rather	than	tax	avoidance	and	the	framing	of	the	GAAR	leaves	open	
many	issues	regarding	“reasonable”	behaviour	(see	TUC,	2013).	Furthermore	the	
GAAR	 specifically	 excludes	 cases	 covered	 by	 double	 taxation	 treaties	 (HMRC,	
2013:	p.	7).	It	seems	unlikely	then	that	the	current	GAAR	can	serve	as	an	effective	
legal	 tool	 to	 address	 tax	 avoidance.	 This	 reaffirms	 the	 significance	 of	 unitary	
taxation	in	changing	the	terms	of	debate.	Moreover,	the	limitations	of	GAAR	may	
well	create	further	impetus	for	change.					
	 This	issue	of	restricted	yet	suggestive	potential	also	applies	to	current	UK	
government	 domestic	 policy	 regarding	 tax	 avoidance.	 In	 his	 2014	 Autumn	
Statement	 Chancellor	 Osborne	 announced	 the	 government	 would	 introduce	 a	
‘diverted	profits	tax’	and	this	was	confirmed	in	the	2015	budget.	The	process	of	
implementation	has	begun	 for	 the	 tax	year	2015‐16	(HMRC,	2015b).	The	 tax	 is	
actually	in	the	form	of	a	25%	levy	on	profits	‘artificially’	shifted	out	of	the	country.	
The	tax	is	yet	to	be	fully	detailed	as	a	regulatory	measure	(in	March	it	remained	
interim,	 thereafter	 it	 is	 embryonic	 in	 the	 2015	 Finance	 Act).	 It	 has	 been	 put	
together	quite	quickly	and	will	evolve	as	it	is	implemented	and	tested.	However,	
the	intention	is	clearly	to	capture	some	portion	of	the	proceeds	of	transfer	pricing.	
As	 a	 levy	 it	 is	 not	 a	 solution	 to	 transfer	 pricing	 but	 rather	 recognition	 of	 the	
continued	significance	of	transfer	pricing,	based	on	separate	entity	status.	It	is	an	
attempt	to	identify	proceeds	within	organizational	circuits.	Identification	simply	
replicates	the	problems	of	implementing	the	arm’s	length	principle.	As	industry	
representatives	have	already	noted,	the	levy	will	create	additional	complexity	and	
legal	dispute.	Moreover,	 the	government	 is	 clearly	 aware	of	 this.	The	Treasury	
forecasts	the	tax	will	generate	revenues	of	£25	million	in	the	first	year,	rising	to	
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£360	million	by	2017‐2018	and	totalling	£1.4	billion	over	the	next	5	years.	The	
sums	seem	large	but	are	actually	small	when	considered	against	the	scale	of	the	
problem.	If	Google,	for	example,	generates	revenues	of	greater	than	£3	billion	per	
annum	in	the	UK	then	Google	alone	could	account	for	at	least	10%	of	the	projected	
figures	for	the	levy	based	on	the	current	headline	corporation	tax	rate	in	the	UK.	
Clearly,	the	policy	is	already	positioned	for	its	own	relative	failure	(even	if	it	hits	
its	forecasts),	and	is	more	eye‐catching	than	effective.	It	does,	however,	serve	to	
sustain	public	and	political	awareness	of	the	issue	of	tax	avoidance	and	this	may	
have	cumulative	effects,	 since	 it	creates	scope	 for	social	movement	momentum	
(within	also	cooperative	endeavours	between	professionals	and	academics,	which	
is	the	basis	of	the	Tax	Justice	Network).	Failure	can	itself	be	a	step	towards	more	
fundamental	change,	since	it	increases	the	discursive	weight	of	the	alternative.													
		 Finally,	there	is	currently	a	regional	unitary	policy	initiative.	This	is	the	EU	
Common	Consolidated	Corporate	Tax	Base	(CCCTB).xiv	First	proposed	in	2001	it	
has	 been	 consistently	 opposed	 by	 the	more	 Eurosceptic	 and	 neoliberal	 states,	
including	the	UK.	However,	the	global	financial	crisis	gave	the	proposal	renewed	
momentum.	Support	amongst	the	Commission	and	from	the	EU	Commissioner	for	
Taxation	resulted	in	a	draft	directive	in	2011.	For	a	directive	to	be	adopted	and	to	
become	EU	law	it	must	be	unanimously	endorsed.	The	UK	and	several	other	states	
remain	opposed	and	the	European	Parliament	expressed	a	variety	of	concerns	in	
2012.xv	The	Commission	in	general	remains	supportive	and	a	new	public	forum	
debate	on	the	CCCTB	and	on	integrating	the	OECD	BEPS	initiatives	began,	summer	
2015,	and	there	is	now	an	Action	Plan	to	relaunch	the	CCCTB	(EC,	2015).	The	2011	
draft	directive	also	recognizes	that	the	CCCTB	could	initially	be	adopted	based	on	
“enhanced	cooperation”.	This	is	a	mechanism	that	allows	a	group	of	EU	members	
to	 implement	a	policy	 that	may	 later	be	adopted	by	all.	Given	 the	public	mood	
regarding	 tax	 avoidance,	 and	 given	 the	 continued	 support	 of	 the	 EU	 Tax	
Commissioner,	there	is	some	possibility	that	this	may	occur	for	the	CCCTB	in	the	
near	future.	The	momentum	for	change	within	the	G‐8(7)	and	G‐20	and	OECD	may	
ultimately	 lead	 in	 this	 direction	 also.	 There	 then	 seems	 great	 scope	 for	 the	
adoption	of	a	unitary	system	and	gradual	incorporation	of	other	states	within	the	
EU	and	then	in	other	regions.	
		
Conclusion	
	
Unitary	 taxation	 based	 on	 formula	 apportionment	 resolves	 an	 underlying	
problem	within	 contemporary	 capitalism.	 It	 has	 multiple	 potential	 benefits.	 It	
prevents	 tax	 minimisation	 where	 real	 and	 effective	 rates	 diverge,	 and	
corporations	are	able	to	choose	not	to	contribute	to	the	reproduction	of	society	
via	corporation	 tax.	 It	provides	grounds	 for	a	 resocialisation	of	 the	 firm,	which	
may	allow	for	more	ethical	behaviour.	It	provides	one	way	to	restore	sovereignty	
to	the	state	in	its	relations	with	corporations	(restoring	also	a	sense	of	justice	and	
fairness	to	the	citizen	and	so	preventing	corrosion	of	commitment	to	the	state).	
However,	a	final	focus	on	actual	policy	trends	can	be	somewhat	deflating	in	terms	
of	presenting	a	case	for	a	major	change.	Here,	it	is	important	to	bear	in	mind	that	
unitary	taxation	has	gained	traction	as	a	policy	alternative	precisely	because	of	
the	 failures	 of	 the	 current	 system.	 Corporation	 tax	 is	 recognized	 as	 deeply	
problematic.	 The	 problem	 has	 definable	 characteristics	 and	 a	 clear	 solution.	
Moreover,	there	is	significant	public	and	political	concern	regarding	the	problem.	
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The	global	financial	crisis	and	its	aftermath	have	placed	a	question	mark	against	
many	 received	 practices,	 including	 the	 tax	 activities	 of	 MNCs.	 There	 is	 then	 a	
critical	context	for	change.	For	this	change	to	occur	requires	awareness	regarding	
the	actual	limits	of	the	current	system	and	the	benefits	of	the	alternative.	It	then	
requires	institutional	project‐building.	The	Corporate	Reform	Collective	(2014),	
the	 Tax	 Justice	 Network	 and	 many	 others	 are	 part	 of	 this	 process.	 The	 very	
existence	of	such	organizations	is	a	reminder	that	the	current	situation	is	equally	
a	historical	consequence	of	broader	forces	and	specific	projects	(see	Palan	et	al,	
2010).	Global	wealth	chains	are	not	mere	happenstance.	As	Brenner	et	al	argue	
(2010:	p.	339),	neoliberalization	‘qualitatively	transformed	what	might	be	termed	
the	 ‘context	 of	 context’,	 that	 is,	 the	 political	 institutional	 and	 juridical	 terrain’.	
However,	the	context	of	context	continues	to	develop	and	the	future	may	range	
across	 a	 variety	of	possibilities.	This	 is	 conditional	 on	 the	 future	of	 knowledge	
transfer	and	positional	persuasive	argument.				
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i	Note,	the	use	of	non‐economic	does	not	imply	a	reductive	‘economism’	(see	Morgan,	editor,	2016).	
It	merely	suggests	it	is	possible	to	differentiate	between	having	an	actual	economic	purpose	and	
having	what	is	essentially	merely	a	tax	purpose.		
ii	 The	 OECD	 guidelines	 identify	 5	 methods	 to	 assess	 transfer	 pricing.	 These	 divide	 into	 three	
preferred	“traditional”	transaction	methods	and	two	transactional	profit	methods	(OECD,	2010).		
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iii	Intra‐firm	transactions	are	supposed	to	be	planned	and	administered,	whilst	markets	are	not.	
The	very	basis	of	efficiency	and	of	price	determination	would	seem	to	imply	the	prices	would	likely	
deviate	between	the	two.	One	can	then	ask	what	real	role	does	the	arm’s	length	principle	play?	See	
Ylonen	and	Teivainen,	2015.			
iv	For	example,	recent	issues	surround	‘Advance	Pricing	Agreements.’	The	corporation	negotiates	
with	a	tax	authority	to	agree	a	transfer	pricing	methodology	to	be	applied	to	a	designated	set	of	
transactions	for	a	given	period	(then	termed	‘covered	transactions’).		
v	The	existence	of	a	loss	may	be	beneficial	since	in	most	tax	authorities	it	creates	the	potential	for	
future	tax	relief	(a	tax	credit).	The	existence	of	some	profit	may	be	beneficial	since	it	allows	the	
firm	to	pay	some	tax	in	the	locality,	facilitating	the	claim	that	taxes	are	paid	and	the	firm	is	both	
compliant	and	a	responsible	corporate	citizen.	
vi	The	issue	for	Ireland	is	complex,	creating	numerous	genuine	economic	problems.	Apple	employs	
over	1,500	people	in	Ireland.	There	are	more	than	1,000	MNCs	located	in	Ireland	employing	in	
total	more	than	150,000	and	this	constitutes	the	highest	proportion	of	total	employment	in	any	
OECD	country.	However,	Senator	McCain	put	the	matter	starkly	in	his	opening	statement	to	the	US	
Senate	Subcommittee:	“Apple	contends	that	none	of	its	subsidiaries	in	Ireland	reduce	its	U.S.	tax	
liability	by	one	cent.	This	statement	is	demonstrably	false.”	(McCain	in	Levin	2013:	p.	9;	for	Apple’s	
rejoinder	 see	 the	 testimonies	 of	 Timothy	 Cook	 CEO	 and	 other	 Apple	 representatives	 in	 Levin,	
2013)	
vii		“According	to	Article	107(1)	of	the	Treaty	on	the	Functioning	of	the	European	Union	(TFEU),	
state	aid,	which	affects	 trade	between	Member	States	and	 threatens	 to	distort	competition	by	
favouring	certain	undertakings	is	in	principle	incompatible	with	the	EU	Single	Market.	Selective	
tax	advantages	may	amount	to	state	aid.”	(EC,	2014).			
viii	Low	commitment	capitalism	involves	the	opportunity	for	a	corporation	to	position	itself	in	ways	
that	maximise	its	capacity	to	‘free	ride’	on	society	through	a	number	of	strategies	made	possible	
by	neoliberalism	(see	Neilson	et	al.,	2014	for	sources).		
ix However,	the	issue	of	the	relation	of	tax	to	fiscal	policy	depends	also	on	how	one	conceives	money	
and	money	creation	‐	and	this	is	a	matter	of	significant	dispute	based	on	the	work	of	Knapp,	Innes,	
Ingham,	Wray	and	many	others.	
x	One	should	also	not	neglect	the	more	sinister	consequences	of	our	current	tax	system.	According	
to	the	Tax	Justice	Network,	tax	havens	host	accumulated	wealth	estimated	at	more	than	US$21	
trillion	 (Henry,	 2012).	 Access	 to	 and	 use	 of	 these	 havens	 is	 created	 by	 prominent	 financial	
organizations.	 The	 existence	 of	 such	 havens	 then	 also	 provides	 a	 location	 for	 wealth	 to	 be	
fraudulently	siphoned	away	from	states	and	concealed,	and	for	organized	crime	to	launder	money	
and	store	wealth.	The	United	Nations	Office	on	Drugs	and	Crime	(UNODC)	estimates	that	between	
US$800	billion	and	US$2	trillion	per	annum	is	laundered	via	tax	havens	(UNODC,	2014).	
xi	Goodhart	and	Ashworth	(2014)	estimate	that	the	UK	gray	economy	has	grown	by	4%	since	the	
end	of	2007.		
xii	This	statement	was	made	in	the	context	of	further	controversy	in	2013	regarding	the	testimony	
to	the	UK	Parliamentary	Affairs	Committee	of	Matt	Brittin,	Google’s	vice‐president	for	northern	
and	central	Europe.	Brittin	had	stated	 to	 the	Committee	 that	UK	Google	 staff	did	not	 complete	
(‘close’)	the	sale	of	advertising	and	that	this	was	done	in	Ireland.	A	former	Google	employee	Barney	
Jones	then	came	forward	with	a	dossier	of	more	than	100,000	e‐mails	that	challenged	this	claim,	
though	it	hinges	on	exactly	what	‘close’	means	(Ungoed‐Thomas	and	Duke,	2013).	
xiii	 An	 additional	 initiative	 worth	 consideration	 is	 the	 US	 Foreign	 Account	 Tax	 Compliant	 Act	
(FATCA)	2010.	This	targets	tax	abuse	indirectly	by	placing	a	pressure	on	intermediaries	operative	
in	US	territories	to	sanction	third	parties;	it	thus	extends	US	influence	to	non‐US	spaces	and	actors.	
The	Act	also	encourages	other	OECD	states	to	emulate	its	position,	so	the	approach	is	unilateral	
but	directed	at	multilateral	transformation	(see	Palan	and	Wigan,	2014)	See	also	Richard	Murphy’s	
UK	Fair	Tax	Mark	initiative.	http://www.fairtaxmark.net/ftm15‐historic‐day‐fair‐tax‐mark/	
xiv	It	is	based	on	the	following	formula,	the	algebra	alters	slightly	for	the	2011	directive	(EC,	2011a:	
Article	86,	p.	49):	
	
xv		Notably	that	adoption	creates	transitional	risks	and	uncertainty	for	individual	states	and	that	
the	policy	may	lead	to	pressure	for	harmonisation	of	corporation	tax,	which	some	of	the	states	who	
consider	tax	to	be	a	part	of	a	competitive	environment	oppose.	
